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FAITH, PROBABILITY AND INFINITE PASSION: 
RAMSEYIAN DECISION THEORY AND 
KIERKEGAARD'S ACCOUNT 
OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 
Robert C. Koons 
I propose an account of Christian faith, inspired by Kierkegaard's Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, according to which (1) belief involves a relation to 
factual religious propositions, but (2) the strength of religious belief is meas-
ured, not by the degree of one's confidence in the truth of these propositions, 
but rather by the degree to which the desirability of possible states of the 
world is affected by whether they include the truth of these propositions. I 
will defend this Kierkegaardian view by means of two mathematical tools 
developed in the twentieth century: Frank Ramsey's decision theory, and 
Robinson's theory of hyper-real numbers. I hope to show that Kierkegaard's 
hypothesis that Christian faith is an infinite passion can be formulated pre-
cisely and shown to be mathematically coherent. 
The logical treatment of the nature of religious belief (here I will concentrate 
on belief in Christianity) has been distorted by the acceptance of a false 
dilemma. On the one hand, many (e.g., Braithwaite, Hare) have placed the 
significance of religious belief entirely outside the realm of intellectual cog-
nition. According to this view, religious statements do not express factual 
propositions: they are not made true or false by the ways things are. Religious 
belief consists in a certain attitude toward the world, life, or other human 
beings, or in what sorts of things one values. On the other hand, others (such 
as Swinburne!) have taken religious belief to include (at least) being certain 
of the truth of particular factual religious propositions. The strength of a 
person's religious belief is identified with his degree of confidence in the 
truth of those propositions, measured by the subjective probability which 
those propositions have for that person. I propose a third alternative, accord-
ing to which, (1) contrary to the first view, religious belief does involve a 
relation to factual religious propositions, such as that God exists, that Jesus 
was God and man, etc.,-propositions which are made true or false by the 
way things actually are-but, (2) contrary to the second view, the strength of 
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religious belief is measured, not by the degree of one's confidence2 in the 
truth of these propositions, but rather by the way in which the value or 
desirability to oneself of the various ways the world could be is affected by 
their including or not including the truth of these religious propositions. Thus, 
religious belief does consist in what one values or prizes, not in what one 
takes to be probably true, and yet this does not deprive the distinctive propo-
sitions of theology of their factual significance. 
This third alternative was articulated by Kierkegaard, most explicitly in his 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript. 3 I will defend this Kierkegaardian view 
by means of two mathematical tools developed in the twentieth century: 
decision theory, originating in the work of Frank Ramsey in the 30's, and the 
theory of hyper-real numbers (also known as "non-standard analysis"), de-
veloped by Abraham Robinson in the 60's. I hope to show that Kierkegaard's 
hypothesis that Christian faith is an infinite passion can be formulated pre-
cisely and shown to be mathematically coherent and scientifically plausible. 
I will also point out a connection between this view and recent work on an 
anti-foundationalism epistemology of religion by Alvin Plantinga, and I will 
discuss the implications of this sort of theory of faith for Christian apologetics. 
1. Ramseyian Decision Theory 
In a paper entitled "Truth and Probability,"4 Frank P. Ramsey sought to 
provide an operational or behavioral definition of the notion of 'degree of 
belief' or 'degree of confidence of truth,' as well as the correlative notion of 
'desirability' or 'utility' or 'subjective value.' Ramsey imagines an idealized 
experimental set-up in which both the degrees of belief of the experimental 
subject in various propositions, i.e., the subject's 'subjective probability func-
tion,' and the degrees of desirability which the subject attaches to the states 
of affairs represented by such propositions, i.e., the subject's 'utility func-
tion,' may be measured. Ramsey imagines that the subject is confronted by 
what he (the SUbject) believes to be an omnipotent and totally trustworthy 
Bookie, who offers the subject a series of choices between pairs of options. 
Some of these options come in the form of simple bets: e.g., an option which 
might be offered to the subject might be: ex if p is true; otherwise, ~. If the 
subject's choices conform to certain principles of mutual coherency (plus an 
axiom of mathematical continuity, which, as we shall see later, is quite a big 
assumption), then there exists a unique representation of the subject's state 
of mind in terms of a probability function taking as its values real numbers 
in the interval from 0 to 1 and a utility function taking real numbers as its 
values.5 
Ramsey's all-powerful Bookie is merely a vivid metaphor for the uncer-
tainties of the world confronting any human agent. We act because we believe 
that our actions will change in some way the probability-of-occurrence of 
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conditions or states of affairs to which we assign positive or negative value. 
The choices made by a reflective, psychologically stable agent will reflect 
that agent's assessment of the various possible outcomes and his degree of 
belief in the various propositions of the form: if I do A, B will result. Ideally, 
we can, from a large number of observations of the agent's choices, recon-
struct the underlying probability and utility functions guiding those choices. 
Ramsey's method can be illustrated by the following step-by-step proce-
dure. First, we must define what Ramsey calls an "ethically neutral proposi-
tion." Proposition p is ethically neutral for our subject just in case he does 
not care at all whether this proposition is true. A proposition like 'there are 
an even number of hairs on Dan Quayle's head' would be ethically neutral 
for just about anyone. Second, we must find an ethically neutral proposition 
which the subject believes with a subjective probability of exactly 112. We 
can tel that p has a probability of 112 for him if there are two states of affairs 
a and p6 such that he prefers a to P but he is indifferent between the gamble 
a if p, otherwise p, and the gamble p if p, otherwise a. For example, my 
subjective probability that Dave will beat Mike at tennis is exactly 112 if I'm 
indifferent between choosing a ticket which pays $1 if Dave wins, nothing if 
Mike does, and a ticket which pays $1 if Mike wins, nothing if Dave does 
(assuming that I prefer to be $1 richer). 
Once we've found a proposition believed with probability 112, we can use 
this proposition to calibrate the subject's utility or desirability scale. A gamble 
which offers (what the subject takes to be) a 50% chance of a and a 50% 
chance of p will have a value to that subject which is exactly the average of 
the values of a and p. If the subject is indifferent between such a gamble and 
a state of affairs y, then the value of y must lie exactly half-way between the 
values of a and p. Once we arbitrarily fix the origin and unit of our utility 
scale, all possible states of affairs can be assigned a definite numerical value 
using this method. 
Given this utility scale, we can now determine the subject's probability 
function, assigning a numerical probability-value to every proposition (in-
cluding those which are not ethically neutral). Suppose we are trying to 
measure the subjective probability for the agent of the proposition p, and 
suppose we find states of affairs a, p and y such that the agent is indifferent 
between the option of a-for-sure and the gamble: p if p, otherwise y. Assum-
ing that the agent always chooses by selecting the option with the greater 
expected value (if there is one), this means that the expected value of the 
gamble is equal to the value of a.7 Letting a, p, and y stand for their own 
utility values, and letting p stand for its own subjective probability, we get 
the equation: 
a = p . ~ + (l - p) Y 
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Solving for p: 
p = (n - y)/(~ - y) 
On this basis, it is possible to prove that degrees of belief, so defined, must 
satisfy the axioms of classical probability theory. 
Besides assuming the existence of an ethically neutral proposition believed 
to degree 112, Ramsey assumes seven other axioms concerning the choices 
of the experimental subject in order to prove that this procedure will enable 
us to assign unique real numbers as the values of the subject's probability 
and utility function. Four of these axioms stipulate that the subject's choices 
are mutually coherent. Two others can be thought of as insubstantial ideali-
zations, stipulating that for any real number there is a state of affairs with 
exactly that value. The last assumption, the axiom of Archimedes, falls under 
neither of these categories. It is a substantial assumption about the subject, 
and one which it would not be incoherent for the subject to violate. 
Archimedes' axiom is the assumption that any non-empty collection of values 
which has an upper bound has a lowest upper bound. This amounts to the 
denial that there are infinitely large differences between values. Especially 
in the context of a study of religious belief, where ultimate values are at stake, 
this is a very dangerous assumption to make. 
In the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard characterized faith 
as an infinite passion. 8 By 'passion,' Kierkegaard clearly has in mind some-
thing like desire or striving. It is clearly the impetus of personal decision-
making.9 Therefore, we could plausibly interpret Kierkegaard as claiming that 
reconciliation with God has infinite value for the religious believer, that is, 
a value which is infinitely greater than the value of any state of affairs which 
is lacking this crucial feature. Kierkegaard also claims that the degree of 
probability of Christianity is irrelevant to the believer (so long as it is greater 
than zero, so long as it is at least taken to be possibly true). Ramseyian 
decision theory, once it is modified to permit infinite values, can be used to 
support Kierkegaard's conclusion. 
2. Infinite Values and Hyper-real Numbers 
In the 1960's, Abraham Robinson used the techniques of mathematical logic 
(especially those developed by Skolem and Henkin) to rehabilitate Leibniz's 
intuitive theory of infinitesimals. Robinson showed how a theory which pos-
tulates infinitely large and infinitely small ('infinitesimal') quantities can be 
made mathematically rigorous. This achievement has great, and as of yet, 
largely unrealized, significance for the theory of subjective probability and 
subjective value. As I mentioned above, Ramsey had no justification for 
excluding the possibility of infinite differences in value; he simply lacked 
the mathematical tools for making sense of such a possibility. Consequently, 
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he used Archimedes' axiom to sweep the problem away. Robinson's non-
standard analysis should enable us to do better. 
In non-standard analysis, besides the usual real numbers, there are also 
what are known as 'hyper-real numbers.' Some of these numbers are infinitely 
large, some are infinitely small (the infinitesimals), and some are infinitely 
close to finite real numbers. Among the infinitely large real numbers, there 
are pairs of such numbers which are only finitely far apart, and there are pairs 
which are infinitely far apart. In fact, it is possible to find an infinite series 
of hyper-real numbers, each of which is infinitely larger than its predecessor. 
Likewise, it is possible to find an infinite series of infinitesimals each of 
which is infinitely smaller than its predecessor. 
The combination of Ramseyian decision theory with non-standard analysis 
we can call 'non-standard decision theory.' To illustrate the relevance of 
non-standard decision theory to the study of religious belief, let me produce 
a more concrete example. Let p be the proposition that I enjoy forever the 
beatific vision. Suppose that the difference between the value to me of any 
state of affairs a which includes the truth of p and the value and any ~ which 
includes the falsity of p is infinitely greater than the difference between the 
value of ~ and that of any other state of affairs which includes the falsity of 
p, and infinitely greater than the difference between a and any other state of 
affairs which includes the truth of p. In such a case, we could say that the 
beatific vision is an object of infinite passion for me. If we try to use 
Ramsey's method to measure my degree of belief in p, we run into immediate 
trouble. Let's assume that the subjective probability of p for me is measurable 
by Ramsey's method. Then we can find states of affairs a, ~, and y such that 
I am indifferent between a-for-sure and ~ if p, otherwise y. For the gamble 
to make sense, ~ must include the truth of p, and y must include the falsity 
of p. State a includes either the truth or the falsity of p. Suppose a includes 
the falsity of p (so, in a I don't enjoy the beatific vision). As we have seen, 
the probability of p is the ratio of a - y over ~ - y. Because the second 
difference is infinitely greater than the first (since only in the first case is the 
beatific vision at stake), this means that the probability of p must be infini-
tesimal. In other words, I could be indifferent between a state a in which I 
don't enjoy the beatific vision and a gamble which leaves my chances of 
enjoying the beatific vision unaffected only if my estimate of the probability 
that I will enjoy the beatific vision is infinitesimal. Suppose instead that a 
includes the truth of p. Then both a - y and ~ - yare infinitely greater than 
a - ~, and so the probability of p must be infinitely close to 1. Therefore, the 
probability of p is measurable by Ramsey's method only if it is infinitely 
close to zero or infinitely close to 1. 
Suppose that the probability of p for me is not infinitesimal. Then there is 
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no way that we can find a state a. including the falsity of p which I will prefer 
to a gamble which leaves my chances of enjoying the beatific vision unaf-
fected. If the probability of p is also a finite distance from 1 (absolute cer-
tainty), then we run into the problem that we cannot find a state a. including 
the beatific vision which has a low enough value to enable us to use it in 
measuring my confidence in p. A slight modification of Ramsey's method, 
however, will overcome this problem. All we must do is find two different 
gambles between which I am indifferent: a. if p, otherwise p, and y if p, 
otherwise o. If the probability of p is not exactly 112, we can use the values 
of a., p, y, and 0 to measure the probability of p. Since I am indifferent 
between the two gambles, their expected utilities must be equal: 
pa + (1 - p)~ = py + (1 - p) 0 
Solving this equation for p yields the following equation: 
p = (a - y) + (0 - ~) 
This solves the problem we just encountered, because now both options 
include a mixture or weighted average of the value of the beatific vision and 
of the value of its loss. However, there is one more aspect of the impact of 
religious passion upon the scale of values discussed by Kierkegaard which 
we must consider. Kierkegaard describes Christian faith as involving a "dou-
ble movement" or "double reflection" of the spirit,1O and so far I have only 
taken into account the first movement, the movement of resignation. The 
movement of resignation consists in the fact that all differences between 
merely worldly goods shrink to the vanishing point in comparison with the 
value of being related to God. I have represented this movement by stipulating 
that the difference between enjoying the beatific vision and not enjoying it 
is infinitely greater than any other difference in value. 
The second movement of the spirit, the movement of faith proper, is the 
movement by which the affairs of this life, the details of finite history, assume 
a new, infinite significance as a result of the promises of God. Although the 
value outside God of worldly affairs remains infinitesimal, they take on a 
new value inside God for the believer. The tasks and responsibilities of 
ordinary life take on an infinite significance as opportunities to serve God. 
This second movement of the spirit can be represented in non-standard deci-
sion theory in the following way: if a. and p include the existence of a real 
God to whom I am related by faith, and y and 0 exclude the existence of such 
a God, then, if a. and p have different values at all, the difference between a. 
and p is infinitely greater than the difference between y and o. In other words, 
the supposition of the existence of God infinitely magnifies the differences 
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between values which are at stake as compared to the differences between 
possible states of affairs in which God is supposed to be absent. 
If we suppose the believer's utility function to reflect both of Kierkegaard's 
"movements of the spirit," what happens to the operational or behavioral 
significance of my degree of belief in the truth of Christianity? So long as 
my degree of belief in Christianity is finite and greater than zero, my degree 
of belief has absolutely no behavioral significance! If I am indifferent be-
tween a gamble of a if p, ~ otherwise, and one of"{ if p, 0 otherwise [where 
'p' now represents the existence of the Christian God], then the probability 
of p = (0 - ~)/[a - "() + (0 - ~)], as I calculated above. But now we're supposing 
that the difference a - "{ is infinitely greater than the difference 0 - ~. Con-
sequently, the probability of p must be infinitesimal. If it is not in fact 
infinitesimal, then that means that we will be unable to find two gambles of 
this kind between which I will be indifferent, and the probability which p has 
for me will not be measurable by Ramsey's method. In other words, the value 
which my degree of belief in Christianity actually takes will have absolutely 
no behavioral significance. 
Thus, the distinguishing feature of faith is not that the difference between 
eternal salvation and loss is infinitely greater than the difference between any 
two this-worldly values (the crux of Pascal's wager), but that the introduction 
of God magnifies infinitely the differences in value between this-worldly 
matters, as compared with the differences that would exist for the believer in 
the absence of God. By saying that the introduction of God magnifies the 
differences in value between the various states of this world, I do not mean 
to imply that the relative value of these states is unaffected by this process. 
What I judge to be important and valuable, given the supposition that God 
exists, and what I would judge to be important, given the contradictory 
supposition, would of course be quite different. Acts of kindness toward my 
wife would be relatively important on either suppositions; acts of Christian 
witness relatively more important on the second than the first. 
3. A Kierkegaardian Account of Faith 
What I am supposing to be characteristic of the values of the believer is this: 
any difference in value between possible states of the world in which the 
existence of God is given is infinitely greater than any difference between 
possible states of the world from which God is absent. Thus, as a believer, if 
I suppose that there is no God, then the values which are at stake whenever 
I make any decision, no matter how momentous or how trivial, are infinitesi-
mal in comparison to the values which would be at stake were I to suppose 
the existence of God (here, it is the "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," the 
"God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" who matters). Every decision, no 
matter how trivial the matter, is for the believer of infinitely greater signifi-
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cance given his existence than it would be given his absence, because, given 
the existence of God, every decision affords the opportunity of serving God, 
of drawing closer to Him, of bearing fruitful witness to the world of His love. 
This same analysis can be used to construct a response to the Pyrrhonian 
skeptic, the skeptic who calls into question the existence of a world outside 
one's own perceptions. The application of this analysis to skepticism about 
the "external world" can shed some light on its analogous application to the 
skeptic about religion. A sensible, man-in-the-street response to the Pyrrhonian 
skeptic might go something like this: 
If solipsism, the non-existence of the external world, were really true, then 
nothing I care about deeply would be at stake in any of my decisions. My 
own real health and prosperity, the real welfare of my family and friends, the 
real success of projects and institutions with which I have identified myself-
these things are infinitely more important to me than a mere succession of 
appearances in my own mind. Therefore, so long as there is the slightest 
chance that this external world familiar to me through my senses really exists, 
it is rational for me to base all my decisions on the hypothesis that it does 
exist, to act, in fact, as if I were absolutely certain of this hypothesis. 
This is not a refutation of skepticism, but it is a compelling response to 
Pyrrhonian skepticism, to the skeptic who believes that one's doubt should 
have behavioral implications. The academic skeptic who, like Hume, recog-
nizes the impossibility of demonstrative knowledge of the principles of com-
mon sense but who acts like other men as though he were certain of them is 
untouched by this analysis. Likewise, decision theory points out the irration-
ality (for the believer) of Pyrrhonian skepticism about religion but leaves the 
academic counterpart unscathed. 
It is plausible, however, to suppose that every difference in value which 
presupposes God's existence is infinitely greater for the believer than any 
difference which presupposes His non-existence? For example, does the dif-
ference between my eating a candy bar this afternoon and my not eating one 
really take on infinitely greater significance once the existence of God is 
assumed? I think the answer is clearly, Yes. Anyone who is sure that the 
answer must be No or who is bewildered at how this can be so exhibits a 
fundamental failure to comprehend the significance of God for the believer. 
Whatever the believer does, no matter how trivial it may be in worldly 
estimation, is something which is either done "unto the Lord" (for the glory 
of God, for the deepening of the believer's relation to God) or is done at the 
cost of missing an opportunity to do this, and every good which is received 
as a blessing from God. If a candy bar provides some atom of innocent 
pleasure, the significance of that pleasure is infinitely magnified by supposing 
it to be a gift from God, a token of His love. If a choice concerns the 
disposition of some minute resource, its significance is infinitely magnified 
by supposing the disposition of this resource to be a responsibility of a 
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divinely-commissioned stewardship. I don't mean to suggest that the believer 
agonizes over every trivial decision, worrying about which course of action 
possesses this infinite value. A believer in such a state represents a pathologi-
cal condition of faith. Rather, the normal believer joyfully seizes every op-
portunity to act as an opportunity to walk with God. 
Isn't it wildly implausible, though, to suppose that the difference between 
two barely distinguishable pleasures for one creature, on the supposition that 
God exists, is infinitely more important to the believer than whether or not 
millions of innocent people suffer horrible deaths, on the supposition that 
God does not exist? Surely the intrinsic value difference in the latter case, 
quite apart from any theological aspects, is greater than the difference in the 
former case, whatever its theological ramifications. 
Frankly, I am unmoved by this objection. The significance of the death of 
innocent persons, as compared with other matters, is increased, not dimin-
ished, by the supposition of the existence of the Christian God, since this 
supposition entails that all persons are created in the image of God and 
endowed by God with the right to life. I am only claiming that for the believer, 
the supposition of the truth of the Christian story confers upon all matters a 
magnitude of significance which is infinitely greater than whatever intrinsic 
significance they may have had, apart from their relationship to God. 
From the perspective of faith, every finite value is radicalIy relativized and 
conditioned. That is, the new value which a finite condition obtains in relation 
to God overwhelms, by its infinitely greater magnitude, any significance 
which that condition might have had in isolation from God. To treat the 
intrinsic (God-independent) differences in value of finite conditions as equal 
in magnitude to the differences they acquire in relation to the will and the 
glory of God is to be guilty of idolatry (in its most general form). 
However, if you are unpersuaded that the supposition of God's existence 
can make such an infinite difference to the value of trivial matters of taste 
and preference, it is possible for me to adopt a somewhat weaker claim, 
without substantially altering the account of faith offered here. I could claim 
that, whenever God's existence makes any difference at all to the relative 
values of two states of affairs, it makes an infinitely great difference. This 
would enable me to concede that some matters, those for which the existence 
or non-existence of God has no bearing, remain of only finite significance, 
even on the supposition of God's existence. Perhaps God's existence makes 
no difference at all to the relative value of eating a candy bar or an ice cream 
cone. In that case I could admit that the difference between the two states of 
affairs, even given the existence of God, is less significant than some more 
important issue, even given God's non-existence. 
Let ex. be the value of eating the candy bar in a world in which God exists, 
and ~ be the value of eating the same bar in a godless world. Let y be the 
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value of eating the cone in a world in which God exists,. and 0 be the value 
of the same state in a godless world. Since by hypothesis, God's existence 
makes no difference in this case, a - y is equal to \3 - o. Hence, (a - y) + (0 - \3) 
is equal to zero. Returning again to the Ramsey equation discussed above, 
p= (a-y)+(o-~) 
we can see that p, the subjective probability of God's existence, cannot be 
measured, since the denominator of the equation is equal to zero. Thus, this 
concession would not change the fact that the believer's subjective prob-
ability of God's existence lacks behavioral significance. 
The Kierkegaardian account of faith, as I have construed it, consists of the 
claim that the following two conditions are both necessary and sufficient 
conditions for faith in Christianity: (1) the subjective probability of Christi-
anity is finite and non-zero, II and (2) the difference between any two states 
of affairs including the truth of Christianity is either zero or is infinitely 
greater than the difference between any two states of affairs excluding the 
truth of Christianity. Is there any reason to think that these two conditions 
are really necessary? Suppose the subjective probability of Christianity for 
someone is greater than one-half, but he does not satisfy the second condition 
above. Would it be right to say that he lacks faith? I think so. Unless the 
subjective probability of Christianity is one (or infinitely close to one), such 
a person will bring a certain kind of calculation to every decision of life, 
weighing whether each sacrifice is warranted, given the subjective probability 
of Christianity for him, which kind of calculation is incompatible with an 
attitude of genuine faith. Such a person's commitment to acting as if Chris-
tianity is true is heavily qualified and hedged. This hedging will not charac-
terize one for whom the subjective probability of Christianity is one, but I 
do not think that such epistemic certainty is at all typical of the Christian 
believer. Moreover, the rationality of such absolute certainty is incompatible 
with the doctrines of the hiddenness of God and the obscurity to our present 
faculties of His revelation (I Corinthians 13). 
Are the two Kierkegaardian conditions really sufficient for the existence of 
faith? Why not add that a believer must, in addition to those two conditions, 
meet the further condition of having a SUbjective probability of at least one-
half that Christianity is true? As I demonstrated above, given that one meets 
the two Kierkegaardian conditions, whether one's subjective probability of 
the truth of Christianity takes any particular finite value has absolutely no 
behavioral significance. There are two ways to take this fact. Firstly, one 
could suppose that Ramsey's method provides an operational definition of 
the notion of 'subjective probability.' In this case, one would conclude that 
it makes no sense to ask whether a Kierkegaardian believer's subjective 
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probability of the truth of Christianity is greater or less than one-half. Of 
course, if the claim that it is greater than one-half makes no sense, then one 
cannot add this as a third condition to be met. Alternatively, one could sup-
pose that 'subjective probability' refers to some underlying cognitive state 
which is partially but not exhaustively revealed in behavior. (I prefer this 
second option.) In this case, it does make sense to ask whether the person 
who meets the two Kierkegaardian conditions also assigns Christianity a 
subjective probability greater than one-half. Ramsey's method gives the op-
erational significance of, but does not define, 'subjective probability.' 
Nonetheless, no component of the definition of faith can lack behavioral 
significance, and, therefore, the two Kierkegaardian conditions are sufficient, 
since any further condition would be lacking such significance. In each of 
the three passages in the New Testament in which the nature of faith is set 
forth (Romans 4, Hebrews 11, James 2), the emphasis is on faith as demon-
strated by action. This doesn't entail that we should identify having faith with 
displaying any sort of pattern of behavior, but it does indicate that the refer-
ence of 'faith' is fixed l2 in the Biblical tradition by presenting certain para-
digmatic cases of faith-determined action. In other words, one can think of 
the biblical authors as offering the following sort of "definition" of faith: 
Faith = that state of mind (whatever it may be) which caused Abraham to 
be willing to sacrifice Isaac, and caused Rahab to hide the Israelite 
spies in her home, etc. 
If Abraham, Rahab, and the other heroes of faith satisfied the two 
Kierkegaardian conditions (as I believe they did), then any further condition 
pertaining to their subjective probabilities can be no part of faith, since no 
such condition would have any role in explaining why Abraham bound Isaac, 
why Rahab hid the spies, etc. 
Of course, faith is also displayed by verbal action, e.g., by confessing the 
creed. Can one who meets the two Kierkegaardian conditions but for whom 
the subjective probability of Christianity is quite low confess without hypoc-
risy, "I believe in God the Father, maker of heaven and earth ... "? To think 
that he cannot do so is to beg the very question at issue, viz., does belief (in 
this context) have anything to do with the relevant subjective probability's 
being greater than one-half? If the two Kierkegaardian conditions are suffi-
cient for faith, then one who meets them may truthfully confess, "I believe." 
Moreover, such a person should not hesitate to assert the truth of these 
theological propositions, since the significance of truth-telling is, along with 
all other values, radically dependent for him upon the truth of these very 
propositions. 
Moreover, even if there does exist such a real cognitive state which is the 
subjective probability of the creed for the believer, this state is a highly 
theoretical object. Lacking any behavioral significance, it might also lack 
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introspectibility and indeed any sort of phenomenological trace. In fact, it 
seems quite reasonable to suppose that the state of faith would be pheno-
menologically indistinguishable from certainty, since the propositions of the 
Christian faith guide the believer's actions in exactly the same way they 
would if their subjective probability were one. The Christian faith provides 
the believer with a frame of reference within which all decisions are made: 
its degree of probability is never a relevant issue and thus naturally fades 
from view. The only residual effect of a low subjective probability might be 
the ability to recognize, as many Christians have, that the evidence for the 
truth of Christianity is, objectively speaking, quite inconclusive. But such a 
recognition is surely compatible with a sincere profession of the creed. 
Finally, I want to reiterate and make quite clear that I am not giving an 
anti-realist, anti-metaphysical, deflationary account of the content of theo-
logical propositions. The cognitive content of the creed is not to be identified 
with its functional significance in the life of the believer-with, for example, 
the way in which it figures in the structure of the believer's utility function-, 
any more than it is to be identified with the means of verifying it. Recent 
work in philosophical logic, pioneered by Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke, 
has produced what is known as the "causal theory of reference."!3 This theory 
makes intelligible the possibility that the content of our beliefs transcends 
the function which those beliefs have in the internal economy of the human 
mind. In fact, I would argue that a deflationary, anti-metaphysical account of 
the content of theological propositions would make it unintelligible how such 
propositions could have the role they do in structuring the utility function of 
the believer. It is precisely because God is conceived of as a transcendent, 
infinite Being, the Creator and Redeemer of the world, that the supposition 
of His existence can make such an infinitely great difference to the believer's 
assessments of value. 
I would like to conclude this section by comparing my account with some 
recent work by Alvin Plantinga on the epistemic status of religious beliefs. 
Plantinga has argued that there is no sustainable objection to the claim that 
the central propositions of theism and even of Christianity may be "properly 
basic" for the believer, that is, that the believer is well within his "cognitive 
rights" in accepting such propositions as true without any evidence or reason. 
He has quite effectively refuted efforts by defenders of a Cartesian or em-
piricist foundationalism in epistemology to demonstrate that such proposi-
tions as 'God exists' may not be included in the cognitive foundations of a 
rational individual. In later work, Planting a has identified belief in these 
theological propositions with the state in which these propositions have a 
subjective probability of one. In contrast, on my account beliefs (including 
properly basic beliefs) would come in two kinds: those which are epistemi-
cally grounded (having a subjecti ve probability of one, or infinitely close to 
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one), and those which are pragmatically grounded (propositions with respect 
to which the individual meets the two Kierkegaardian conditions). As I argued 
above, Plantinga's view that religious propositions are epistemically 
grounded for the believer conflicts with the doctrines of the hiddenness of 
God in the present age. 
A defender of Plantinga might respond that my account accounts badly for 
the phenomenology of religious belief. The Christian believer does experi-
ence a kind of assurance or certainty of the truth of Christianity. Nonetheless, 
this experience can be plausibly accounted for by my account. The experience 
of certainty comes about as a result of a process of framing. When one acts 
habitually and constantly as if Christianity were true, when one consistently 
ignores all contrary possibilities in reaching any decision, the truth of Chris-
tianity provides a kind of frame within which all cognitive activity takes 
place. Typically, Christianity will be experienced as having the same quality 
as any proposition whose probability conditional on the frame is one. This 
will, of course, include all those propositions whose absolute subjective prob-
ability is one. Thus, the phenomenological similarity of pragmatically and 
epistemically grounded beliefs. At the same time, it is important to note that 
there is a phenomenological difference between religious convictions and 
apprehensions of self-evident truths, a difference which becomes evident in 
times of religious crisis. At such times, the pragmatic frame provided by 
Christianity is called into question. It is a peculiar advantage of my account 
that this phenomenological difference, as well as the similarity, can be ac-
counted for. 
4. Contrast with Pascal sWager 
The idea of positing infinite differences in values in glvmg a decision-
theoretic account of religious faith obviously owes a great deal to Pascal's 
discussion of the Wager in his Pensees. Nonetheless, my Kierkegaardian 
account of faith differs from Pascal's in two important ways. First of all, the 
analysis does not depend on the claim that eternal salvation is infinitely 
greater than any worldly value, as does Pascal's. Instead, the crucial claim is 
that differences in value between this-worldly states of affairs are infinitely 
greater for the believer on the religious hypothesis than on its denial. 
Kierkegaard claimed that the touchstone of faith is to bring the "God-idea" 
into relation with every detail of the finite world. 14 
Secondly, the Kierkegaardian analysis of faith does not entail the necessity 
of manipulating one's intellectual judgments in order to bring them into line 
with one's religious affirmation. Pascal argued that it was rational to sacrifice 
one's rationality, one's intellectual integrity, for the sake of the greater value 
of salvation. In contrast, on Kierkegaard's account, faith in the objectively 
improbable does not require any corruption of the intellect. One can have 
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perfect faith, all the while recogmzmg that what one affirms in faith is 
improbable on the evidence. In fact, Kierkegaard regarded the courage which 
is required to launch out in the venture of faith in the face of this intellectually 
acknowledged improbability as the principal virtue of faith. "The conclusion 
of belief is not so much a conclusion as a resolution, and it is for this reason 
that belief excludes doubt."15 
5. Implications for Apologetics 
One function of traditional apologetics remains crucial on my account: the 
task of responding to purported refutations of theism or Christianity, such as 
the argument from evil. If the opponent can demonstrate that Christianity is 
false, then its subjective probability should be zero (or at least infinitesimal) 
and the rationality of religious belief collapses, whatever one's utility func-
tion. Positive natural theology, the attempt to demonstrate or increase the 
probability of theism by appealing to its confirmation by available evidence, 
would, in contrast, be lacking any relevance to faith. This does not imply that 
such investigations may not be valuable in their own right, as a legitimate 
branch of science or philosophy. It simply implies that the rationality of 
religious belief does not depend upon such results, and would not be affected 
by their absence. 
There still is a legitimate place for positive apologetics for Christianity and 
other specific religious traditions, however. The believer will be concerned 
about which of those traditions which are (by virtue of the believer's utility 
function) live options is most probable. A religious tradition is a live option 
for a Christian believer if the theological facts which it posits have the same 
order of significance for the believer as do the central facts posited by Chris-
tianity. If a competing religious tradition posits the existence of a transcen-
dent god or gods in relation to whom the facts of mundane existence would 
take on the same kind of significance as they would have if Christianity were 
true, then the believer must choose a way of life which takes into cognizance 
the relative probabilities of the competing traditions. 
Moreover, I would not want to go so far as to deny that the study and 
presentation of evidence of design and of reported miracles are of no rele-
vance to faith in theism itself. These can help to excite wonder and awe, to 
fix in the mind a conception of the majesty and grandeur of God which would 
otherwise be missing. And, it is only by forming the conception of the pos-
sibility of such a wonderful God that the transformation of the utility function 
which constitutes the second component of faith may be effected. 
The principal implication of my account is, not that the intellectual estima-
tion of probabilities be downplayed, but that the affective appreciation of 
value be given its right of place. This should not be understood as any kind 
of romantic rebellion against reason or the intellect, as a leap into irrational-
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ity, subjectivity, or the unrestrained will-to-believe. In fact, religious belief 
as I conceive it conforms to the very paradigm of sober rationality: the 
calculus of decision theory. Nor is there any unleashing of idiosyncratic 
subjectivity. The judgments of infinite differences in value which lie at the 
root of religious belief are not unreasonable or idiosyncratic. Admittedly, 
modern decision theory, with its origins in Hobbes and Bentham, was con-
ceived in the sin of a purely subjective theory of value. However, this sub-
jectivism is not essential to the mathematical tool itself. One can argue that 
is unnatural and unreasonable not to assign values in such a way as to support 
Christian belief. Such argument would be one of the central tasks of Christian 
apologetics, as I conceive it. 
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